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Emission trading systems have been recently proposed in di¤erent
regions to reduce polluting emissions (e.g. in the European Union
for carbon dioxide). One of the objectives of these systems is to en-
courage rms to adopt advanced abatement technologies. However
permits create an incentive to reduce production, which may be seen
as negative by policy makers. Combining the emission trading system
with a more rigid labour market, we show conditions under which it is
possible to avoid this impact keeping the incentives to improve abate-
ment technologies. The analysis is done for oligopolistic rms engaged
in international rivalry.
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1 Introduction
The European Union has decided to launch an emission trading system for
ve energy intensive sectors1. One of the objectives of this carbon dioxide
emission trading system is to create an incentive to adopt advanced abate-
ment technologies: This Directive will encourage the use of more energy-
e¢ cient technologies ...2, see also European Commission (2005). Extensive
literature3 has investigated the convenience of a permits system to reach this
objective (Montero, 2002; Requate and Unold, 2003). However, launching
an emission trading system may have an additional impact: create incentives
to reduce production (Gielen and Moriguchi, 2002). We analyze this impact,
which will generally be seen as negative, studying the conditions under which
this impact can be eliminated keeping the benet of encouraging advanced
abatement technologies.
Since we are interested in analyzing this issue in an international setting,
we build on the model developed by Spencer and Brander (1983) to study
R&D incentives and international rivalry. Thus, we assume duopolistic com-
petition in a national market between a domestic and a foreign rm. The
assumption of imperfect markets is well suited for the sectors a¤ected by the
EU directive (Antweiler and Treer, 2002). We further assume that the do-
mestic country or region (e.g. the European Union) establishes an emission
trading system, while the foreign country (e.g. the United States) does not4.
This implies that the rm producing in the domestic country has to pay the
permit price  when its emissions exceed a limit E of permits grandfathered.
Conversely, when the emissions of the rm producing in the domestic country
are lower than this limit E, the rm can sell permits at the price . Since the
proposal of emission trading in Europe is focused on energy intensive sectors,
we assume that the main inputs in the rms production function are energy,
technology (capital) and labor.
We also analyze the impact of a second big di¤erence between the condi-
tions under which an American (foreign country) and at least some European
(domestic country) rms produce: the rigidity of their labor markets. We
do not study possible revenue-recycling e¤ects or the impact of distortionary
1The sectors are: (i) electricity and heat generation, (ii) iron and steal, (iii) glass, pot-
tery and building materials, (iv) reneries and (v) paper and pulp. (Directive 2003/87/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003).
2Directive 2003/87/EC, whereas (20).
3See Ja¤e et al. (2003) for a survey.
4The European Union has ratied the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and started
the process to launch an emission trading system (see above). The United States has
announced its opposition to the Kyoto Protocol and proposed to ght climate change
through a voluntary approach. However, our analysis is not limited to the Kyoto Protocol.
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taxes, as has been done in most of the literature that has linked environmen-
tal policy (mainly taxes) and labor markets (Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996;
Parry et al., 1999). On the contrary, we link environmental policy and labor
policy to avoid the negative impacts on production decisions of the former.
The analysis entails a sequential decision. In a rst stage rms choose
technology, while production and sales occur in a second stage. We sup-
pose that the government is not interested in emission reductions obtained
through reductions in production (due to undesired impacts on employment
and growth), while it is interested in emission reductions induced by techno-
logical changes. Since it is easy to show that setting up an emission trading
system implies production reductions, we analyze the possibility to avoid
these consequences via an increase in labor market rigidity. We obtain the
conditions under which this is possible, keeping the benets of the emission
trading system (enhanced abatement technologies). Given the international
rivalry context analyzed, we focus on relative levels of technology.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model.
Section 3 studies optimal production decisions. Section 4 analyzes optimal
technology decisions. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
There are two countries, designated by the subscripts n = 1; 2 (we will also
call them, respectively, domestic and foreign country). The exchange rate
between these two countries is constant.
A single homogeneous good is sold in a duopolistic market in country
1. Each country has a representative rm whose sales are denoted yn. The
duopoly equilibrium arises from the sales: y1+ y2. Cournot-Nash behavior is
assumed. We focus, for simplicity, on the rms relative competitiveness for
selling in the duopolistic market of country 1 (i.e. we do not consider sales
in country 2). The revenue function is denoted Rn(y1; y2). The following
standard assumptions apply5, for 8n 2 (1; 2) and 8i; j 2 (1; 2):
Rin > 0;R
j
n < 0;R
ii
n < 0;R
jj
n > 0 and R
ij
n < 0; (1)
Outputs y1 and y2 are substitutes. Increasing the output of one good de-
creases the marginal revenue of the other good. Energy inputs (en), technol-
ogy (xn) and labor (ln) are the main components in the rmsproduction
5Superscripts are used to denote the letter entry in a function for which di¤erentiation
is done. The number indicates the order of the letter in the denition of the function.
That is: R1(y1; y2) =
@R(y1;y2)
@y1
; and R12(y1; y2) =
@2R(y1;y2)
@y1@y2
:
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function: yn = fn(en; xn; ln). An essential assumption is that the production
of each rm takes place in its home country.
The unit costs of energy is given by p1 and p2. To simplify we assume
that these prices are per unit of emissions associated to a given energy6 (i.e.
we give the price not in tons of oil but in tons of CO2 associated to a ton of
oil).
Country 1 is assumed to have an emission trading market (since we are
under perfect information, similar results would be obtained using a tax).
Hence, rms in country 1 have to pay  (permit price) whenever the number
of tons of carbon emitted (e1) is higher than a given amount of permits
grandfathered E. The value of the latter variable determines if rms are
environmentally constrained(i.e. E < e1). Hence, for E < e1 the rm has
an additional cost owing to the need to buy permits, while for E > e1 the
rm has an additional source of benets (the income of the permits sold).
The domestic rm, although a duopolist in its main market, is supposed to
be too small to inuence the price in the emission trading market, a market
that covers several sectors. Therefore, rm 1 is price-taker in the emission
trading market and cannot inuence : In country 2; no emission trading is
established, nor any other abatement measure such as carbon taxes.
Labor (ln) has a wage cost of wn. We assume that country 1 has a rigid
market, where redundancy cost  arises when a rm wants to reduce its labor
force below a historical level L (no redundancy costs exist in country 2). The
value of this latter variable determines if rms are socially constrained, in
the sense that L > l1. We will assume that this relation always holds.
Technology (xn) covers all kind of investments which increase productivity
of energy (CO2 emissions) via technology. It can be seen as capital or as
R&D investments (Spencer and Brander, 1983). The net cost of investing in
technology (xn) is determined by the unit cost of technology (vn).
Energy, technology and labor inputs are characterized by either decreas-
ing or constant returns. Energy e¢ ciency is either increasing or constant
as technology investment increases, and so is labor e¢ ciency. By the same
token, technology e¢ ciency is either increasing or constant as labor invest-
ment increases. Thus, the following relations hold, for 8n 2 (1; 2) and
8i; j 2 (1; 2; 3):
f in > 0; f
ii
n  0 and f ijn  0 (2)
In certain of the subsequent derivations it will be essential to make explicit
reference to the demand for energy, which entails an inversion of the pro-
duction function: en = k(yn; xn; ln). Accordingly, we have the following set
6We could also use e1 for emissions and e1 for energy but it would complicate the
results with no real gain.
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of assumptions regarding the partial derivatives for this inverse function, for
8n 2 (1; 2) and 8i; j 2 (1; 2; 3):
kin > 0; k
j
n < 0; k
ii
n  0 and kijn  0
In the same way, we shall use the demand for labor ln = h(yn; xn; en). For
8n 2 (1; 2) and 8i; j 2 (1; 2; 3) we have:
hin > 0;h
j
n < 0;h
ii
n  0 and hijn  0
In addition, all third order derivatives for k and h are assumed to be zero,
i.e. kijm = hijm = 0;8 i; j;m 2 (1; 2; 3).
Taking into account these assumptions, we have the following asymmetric
specications for the domestic and the foreign rmsprot functions:
1 = R1(y1; y2)  p1e1   w1l1   v1x1   (e1   E)  (L  l1) (3)
2 = R2(y1; y2)  p2e2   v2x2   w2l2 (4)
with L > l1; en = k(yn; xn; ln) and ln = h(yn; xn; en).
Firms optimize sequentially the values for yn and xn, starting with its
technology decisions. In the rst stage, abatement technology decisions are
made anticipating their impact on production decisions in the following stage
(production decisions give energy and labor requirements, once the technol-
ogy is xed). Since we have a two stages game with complete information,
the equilibrium concept to be used is the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE)
proposed by Selten (1965, 1975). The SPE assumes common expectations on
players behavior. That is, each player holds a correct conjecture about the
opponents strategic choices. The strategies of rms 1 and 2 form an SPE if
the strategies form a Nash equilibrium on each stage of the game. However,
since we work with general functions, studying the existence and the unique-
ness of the SPE explicitly is rather complicated. Thus, we will characterize
the behavior of the rms by means of a comparative statics analysis.
3 Firmsoptimal production decisions
The solutions for the model are determined iteratively, in a standard fash-
ion, by backward induction, analyzing rst the second stage (optimal output
levels of the rms), given the technology decisions taken on stage 1. Thus,
in this section we o¤er an initial characterization of the asymmetric nature
of the ex post output decisions of both rms, focusing on the situation where
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a duopoly prevails in the domestic market. Specically, a duopoly outcome
arises when:
R1(y1; y2)  p1e1 + wili + (e1   E1) + (L  l1); with L > l1 (5)
However, when this condition does not hold, the domestic rm faces an envi-
ronmental and/or social constraint that forces it to shut down and the foreign
rm takes over the entire domestic market. Our modelling assumptions entail
concave revenue functions and production functions which are either concave
or linear in energy use for, respectively, the cases of decreasing and constant
returns to scale. Since the domestic rms marginal revenue is falling as
output increases, whereas its marginal costs are either constant or rising, the
inequality in (5) will be reversed for su¢ ciently large values of y1.
Nevertheless, as stated, we will focus on the duopoly outcome when con-
dition (5) is fullled. Under the Cournot-Nash assumption, the rst-order
conditions (which give rmsreaction functions) are:
11(y1; y2; x1; l1; e1) = R
1
1   (p1 + )k11   (w1   )h11 = 0 (6)
22(y1; y2; x1; l1; e1) = R
2
2   p2k12   w2h12 = 0 (7)
21 = R
2
1 < 0; 
1
2 = R
1
2 < 0 (8)
The second-order conditions for a prot maximum are:
111 = R
11
1   (p1 + )k111   (w1   )h111 < 0
222 = R
22
2   p2k112   w2h112 < 0
121 = R
12
1 < 0; 
21
2 = R
21
2 < 0
Given these second-order conditions, it is clear that an assumption that the
wage rate is greater than potential redundancy costs for a representative
worker (w1    > 0) is a su¢ cient condition to guarantee that the domestic
rms reaction function is downward sloping. For simplicity, we will assume
that this inequality always holds. We further assume that the other standard
conditions for existence of duopoly equilibrium apply (in order to ensure
uniqueness and global stability of the equilibrium): A = 111 
22
2  121 212 > 0,
111 < 0 and 
22
2 < 0. The implicit Cournot-Nash equilibrium solutions of
these conditions can be denoted as y1 = q1(x1; x2) and y

2 = q2(x1; x2).
Total di¤erentiation of the rst-order conditions gives:
d11 = 0 = 
11
1 dy1 +
12
1 dy2   [(p1 + )k121 + (w1   )h121 ]dx1
 (p1 + )k131 dl1   (w1   )h131 de1
d22 = 0 = 
22
2 dy2 +
21
2 dy1  

p2k
12
2 + w2h
12
2

dx2   p2k132 dl2   w2h132 de2
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Substituting, we have:
q11 = dy1=dx1 = [(p1 + )k
12
1 + (w1   )h121 ]222 =A > 0
q21 = dy1=dx2 =  

p2k
12
2 + w2h
12
2

121 =A < 0
q21 = dy2=dx1 =  [(p1 + )k121 + (w1   )h121 ]212 =A < 0
q22 = dy2=dx2 =

p2k
12
2 + w2h
12
2

111 =A > 0
Taking the total di¤erential of the rst-order condition for the domestic
rm, we have:
dy2
dy1
=
 111
121
=
  [R111   (p1 + )k111   (w1   )h111 ]
R121
< 0 (9)
Note that an increase in the value of  leads to smaller values for the nu-
merator in (9), generating (ceteris paribus) a steeper slope for the downward
sloping reaction function of rm 1 (in the scenario where that rm is envi-
ronmentally constrained and a duopoly solution still applies). As expected,
this leads to a lower (higher) level of equilibrium output for the domestic
(foreign) rm.
This result enables us to write the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Setting up an emission trading system induces the domestic
rm to reduce its level of production.
Figure 1 illustrates the competitive e¤ects on the output (sales) shares
of both rms, which result from a hypothetical structural change where rm
1 faces a more stringent emission trading market due to an increase in the
permit price. As a result of higher permit prices (d > 0) the reaction
function7 of rm 1 (RF1) gets steeper and the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
shifts from N to N(reducing the market share of rm 1).
On the contrary, an increase in the value of  leads to a larger value
for the numerator in (9), generating (ceteris paribus) a atter slope for the
downward sloping reaction function of rm 1 (in the scenario where that rm
is socially constrained and a duopoly solution still applies). In turn, this will
lead to a higher (lower) level of equilibrium output for the domestic (foreign)
rm. Just the opposite of the result we obtained for the emission trading.
This result enables us to write the following proposition:
7Note that the reaction function of rm 1 (RF1) is truncated for high levels of y1, owing
to the social and environmental constraints which can force the rm out of the market for
high levels of production. Thus, it is easy to draw a situation where RF1 and RF2 do not
cross at any point.
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Proposition 2 Setting up a social constraint induces the domestic rm to
increase its level of production.
This result shows that a rigid market can be a protection against the
output reduction induced by the emission trading scheme. Of course, this
is only possible as long as the survival of the rms is not endangered (how-
ever, in sectors with strong market power this survival will generally not be
threatened).
The intuition for this result is that when a rm is socially constrained
it faces non-redeemable sunk costs associated with dismissing workers. As
long as inequality (5) holds, the rm faces a trade-o¤ between, on the one
hand, accepting additional variable production costs associated with higher
output levels (including the marginal wage bill of maintaining workers) and,
on the other hand, paying the costs of dismissing existing employees. Due to
this trade-o¤, the socially constrained rm will be induced to obtain a larger
market share than a competitor operating in a exible labor market. Hence,
higher redundancy costs can be seen as decreasing net variable wage costs,
as reected by the term (w1   ). The essential point is that the impact of
these redundancy costs is to face rms with additional potential sunk costs,
(L  l1) for L > l1, and not higher variable costs.
In fact, the equilibrium point N of gure 1 could be found again for a
reaction function which combines simultaneously (d > 0), which tends to
make the reaction function steeper, and (d > 0), which tends to make
the reaction function atter. Hence, a policy-mix strategy (emission trading
plus increased labor market rigidity) could reduce or eliminate the negative
impact on production brought about by an emission trading scheme. This
is possible since  is set by the government, and not by the market like .
More precisely, we can write the following corollary:
Corollary 1 If  is set such that  = (k111 =h
11
1 ), neither the envi-
ronmental constraint (emission trading) nor the social constraint have any
impact on production decisions of the domestic rm.
Proof. Substitute in (9).
This implies, of course, that the emission trading system has no impact
on emissions via production decisions, but in a problem like climate change
long-term emission reductions are more relevant and they will be associated
to technology decisions, which we will analyze in the next section. Govern-
ments interest to keep production constant can be explained in two ways: (i)
the preoccupation about unemployment (very strong in Europe), since lower
production implies in our model lower employment in the domestic country,
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and (ii) the interest in not reducing Gross Domestic Product (GDP), since
growth is generally the basic tool to evaluate overall governmental policies (as
long as price e¤ects do not o¤set the negative impact of reduced production).
On the other hand, it is also immediate to show that increasing the en-
vironmental constraint (d > 0) and at the same time reducing the rigidity
of the markets (d < 0), a policy often recommended for continental Eu-
rope, implies to create two incentives to reduce production, thus enabling an
increased market share for foreign rms.
4 Firmsoptimal technology decisions
Assuming that a duopoly equilibrium prevails, the implicit Cournot-Nash
equilibrium solutions for the ex post determination of the duopolistsoutput
level are represented by y1 = q

1(x1; x2) and y

2 = q

2(x1; x2): For commodity
we drop the asterisk in what follows, however, the output values used in
this section are equilibrium values. Substituting these expressions into the
general form of the prot functions we get:
g1 = R1(q1(x1; x2); q2(x1; x2))  (w1   )h1(q1(x1; x2); x1)
 (p1 + )k1(q1(x1; x2); x1)  v1x1   L+ E (10)
g2 = R2(q1(x1; x2); q2(x1; x2))  w2h2(q2(x1; x2); x2)
 p2k2(q2(x1; x2); x2)  v2x2 (11)
Maximizing these prot functions with regard to technology investment levels
(x1 and x2) we obtain the following expressions for the ex ante rst-order
conditions (using (6) and (7)):
g11 = R
2
1q
1
2   (w1   )h21   (p1 + )k21   v1 (12)
g22 = R
1
2q
2
1   w2h22   p2k22   v2 (13)
g21 = R
2
1q
2
2 < 0; g
1
2 = R
1
2q
1
1 < 0
The associated second-order conditions are :
g111 = R
2
1q
11
2 + (R
21
1 q
1
1 +R
22
1 q
1
2)q
1
2   (w1   )(h211 q11 + h221 )  (p1 + )(k211 q11 + k221 ) < 0
g222 = R
1
2q
22
1 + (R
11
2 q
2
1 +R
12
2 q
2
2)q
2
1   w2(h212 q22 + h222 )  p2(k212 q22 + k222 ) < 0
We note:
B = g111 g
22
2   g121 g212 > 0
with:
g121 = R
2
1q
12
2 + (R
21
1 q
2
1 +R
22
1 q
2
2)q
1
2   (w1   )h211 q21   (p1 + )k211 q21
g212 = R
1
2q
21
1 + (R
12
2 q
1
2 +R
11
2 q
1
1)q
2
1   w2h212 q12   p2k212 q12
9
Taking the di¤erential of the rst-order conditions, we have :
dg11 = g
11
1 dx1 + g
12
1 dx2 = 0
dg22 = g
21
2 dx1 + g
22
2 dx2 = 0
The slope of the reaction functions for rms 1 and 2 are:
dx2
dx1
=  g
11
1
g121
< 0 if g121 < 0
dx2
dx1
=  g
21
2
g222
< 0 if g212 < 0
Noting:
C = R21q
11
2 + (R
22
1 q
1
2 +R
21
1 q
1
1)q
1
2   w1(h211 q11 + h221 )  p1(k211 q11 + k221 )
D = k211 q
1
1 + k
22
1
E = R21q
12
2 + (R
21
1 q
2
1 +R
22
1 q
2
2)q
1
2   w1h211 q21   p1k211 q21
F = k211 q
2
1
G = h211 q
1
1 + h
22
1
H = h211 q
2
1
we have:
dx2
dx1
=  

C   D + G
E   F + H

We can now write the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Without social constraint ( = 0), the introduction of an
emission trading system
(i) induces a higher relative level of technology in the domestic rm if q11 <
 k221 =k211 :
(ii) may induce a lower relative level of technology in the domestic rm only
if q11 >  k221 =k211
Proof. The introduction of an emission trading system implies an in-
crease from  = 0 to  =  (where  is the permit price in the market).
Then, dx2=dx1 increases if and only if:
 

C
E

<  

C   D
E   F

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or:
ED   CF > 0 (14)
We know that F > 0 and (starting from a position where g121 < 0) E < 0. In
addition, with
q11 <  
k221
k211
(su¢ cient condition)
we have D < 0 and C < 0 (since g111 = C   D < 0). Hence, we can ensure
ED   CF > 0.
On the contrary, dx2=dx1 decreases if and only if (14) is inversed (i.e.
ED   CF < 0). This condition is checked for some values of q1 such that:
q11 >  
k221
k211
(necessary condition)
The formulation of the proposition stresses the point that we can ensure
a positive impact on the level of technology in the domestic rm if: q11 <
 k221 =k211 , while we cannot preclude this positive impact if: q11 >  k221 =k211 .
This impact on technology decisions will reduce emissions in the domestic
country (since k21 < 0).
That is, if the impact of an increase in technology on the optimal output
(q11) is small (smaller than a positive value  k221 =k211 ) the rm in country 1 is
interested in increasing technology since this will increase energy e¢ ciency
(reducing the number of permits to buy per unit of output) with a reduced
cost in terms of new permits to buy due to higher production. On the
contrary, if (q11) is large, the additional permits that the rm has to buy due
to the increase in production associated with a higher level of technology may
not be worth the increase in e¢ ciency obtained by the enhanced technology.
We will now analyze the impact of the social constraint on the technology
decisions induced by an emission trading system. We will rst analyze the
impact of existing labor market rigidity () at the moment where the emis-
sion trading system is launched. Afterwards, we will study the impact of a
simultaneous increase of the environmental and the social constraint. On the
rst issue, we can write the following proposition:
Proposition 4 The presence of a social constraint when an emission trading
system is established favors higher relative levels of technology in the domestic
rm if:
 k
22
1
k211
<  h
22
1
h211
11
Proof. The equivalent to condition (14) is now:
 

C + G
E + H

<  

C   D + G
E   F + H

or:
(ED   CF ) +  (DH  GF ) > 0 (15)
The new term in (15) is positive (with  > 0) as long as k221 h
21
1 > h
22
1 k
21
1 .
That is, with q11 <  k221 =k211 <  h221 =h211 we can ensure a positive impact
on technology decisions, since (ED   CF ) (see proposition (3)) as well as
 (DH  GF ) are positive. If q11 >  k221 =k211 (assertation (ii) in proposition
(3)), the chances of having a positive impact on technology decisions increase
as long as  k221 =k211 <  h221 =h211 , since we have an additional positive term
 (DH  GF ), compared to the situation analyzed in proposition (3(ii)).
Hence, two ratios are compared. The ratio formed dividing (i) the sen-
sitivity of k21 (the e¢ ciency of technology to reduce energy requirements) to
changes in the level of technology by (ii) the sensitivity of this e¢ ciency to
changes in output. And the equivalent ratio for the e¢ ciency of technol-
ogy to reduce labor requirements. That is, we are asking what grows faster
with technology (compared to its reduction with production): technology
e¢ ciency to reduce energy consumption or technology e¢ ciency to reduce
labor. If technology e¢ ciency to reduce energy consumption grows relatively
faster, the existence of a social constraint will enhance technology decisions
in the domestic country. This result is relevant in Europe, since the as-
sumption of a rigid market is easy to maintain for some Europeans countries
(e.g. France or Germany) while it is much harder for others (e.g. the United
Kingdom).
In the section on production decisions we proposed to set  = k111 =h
11
1 =
 to eliminate the undesired consequence of emission trading of reducing
domestic production. The question arises whether this practice permits to
keep the benets on technology decisions of the emission trading system. In
proposition (4) we have studied the impact of an existing social constraint on
the technology decisions associated to an emission trading system. Now we
analyze the option of introducing simultaneously an emission trading system
and a social constraint (as discussed in the section on production decisions).
We can write the following proposition (remark that conditions (i) and (ii)
are the same as in proposition (3)):
Proposition 5 If the level of production has no impact on the e¢ ciency
of technology to reduce labor requirements (h211 = 0), simultaneous intro-
duction of an emission trading system and a social constraint such that
 = (k111 =h
11
1 ):
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(i) induces a higher relative level of technology in the domestic rm if q11 <
 k221 =k211 :
(ii) may induce a lower relative level of technology in the domestic rm only
if q11 >  k221 =k211
Proof. The equivalent to condition (14) is now:
 

C
E

<  
24C   

D +
k111
h111
G

E   

F +
k111
h111
H

35
or
(ED   CF ) + k
11
1
h111
(CH   EG) > 0 (16)
With h211 = 0 the new term in (16), compared to equation (14), is positive
(H = 0 and G > 0). For the rst term, the discussion in proposition (3)
applies.
Hence, as long as h211 = 0 the simultaneous introduction of the emission
trading and the social constraint (with  = ) has a positive impact on
relative levels of technology if q11 <  k221 =k211 , as in proposition (3). In
addition, when q11 >  k221 =k211 the chances to have a positive impact are
higher than in the case where  = 0, since (16) has an additional positive
term compared to (14).
The assumption that h211 = 0 is reasonable. In fact, a number of tech-
nologies8 used to increase energy e¢ ciency (and to reduce emissions) do not
have any impact on the amount of labor used (i.e. h21 = 0 for any level
of production). Of course, this does not mean that h211 = 0 only holds for
these kind of technologies, since a constant impact of technology on labor
requirements is enough.
However, if h211 < 0, we can also have positive impacts on technology
decisions with  = . In fact, working on (16) it is possible to show that
 h221 =h211 < q11 and h111 k211 > k111 h211 are su¢ cient conditions9 for the results
(i) and (ii) in proposition (5) to hold. That is, to ensure positive impact
on technology decisions we need the sensitivity of the optimal output to
variations in technology (q11) to be lower than a certain value (see proposition
3), but we also need this sensitivity to be higher than a certain level given by
8For example, if we change a conventional diesel motor for a turbo-diesel in a car (or a
truck) we reduce energy consumption but we still need the same driver.
9The condition (h111 k
21
1 > k
11
1 h
21
1 ) is very strong, since ED  (k111 =h111 )EG are positive
values that have not been taken into account. Hence, the positive impact on technology
decisions has strong chances to occur even if this condition does not hold.
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the sensitivity of labor e¢ ciency. The larger the di¤erence between  h221 =h211
and  k221 =k211 , the larger the options that q11 lies in-between. Hence, we can
say that this positive impact on technology decisions is more likely to happen
if the impact of the technology level on the e¢ ciency of technology to reduce
energy e¢ ciency is large, while the opposite is true for the labor demand. In
addition, we need the ratios formed with the second derivatives for labor and
technology (h111 =k
11
1 and h
22
1 =k
22
1 ) to be larger than the ratio formed with the
cross-derivatives (h211 =k
21
1 ).
Now, if we take the results on the production and the technology deci-
sions together we can show that establishing an emission trading system and
setting the social constraint such that  =  has (i) no impact on produc-
tion decisions (corollary 1) and (ii) will have a positive impact on relative
technology levels if certain conditions are met. First, we need the condi-
tion for this positive impact without the social constraint to be met (see10
proposition (3)). However, this condition should in any case be met when
an emission trading system is established, since otherwise only impacts on
production would arise (which we assume to be seen as negative). Hence, for
the discussion on the convenience of setting the social constraint equal to 
we can assume that this condition is fullled (i.e. if it is not, no emission
trading system should be set up in that sector). Proposition (5) says, un-
der this assumption, that the positive impact on relative technology levels is
guaranteed as long as the level of production has no impact on the e¢ ciency
of technology to reduce labor requirements (h211 = 0). As stated above, this
condition is met for a large number of technologies (if this condition is not
fullled, the conditions to obtain this positive impact on technology are more
complicated, and thus more di¢ cult to check if they hold in the sectors under
consideration).
To sum up, following the strategy of setting the social constraint equal to
, will always avoid impacts on production of the emission trading system
and will allow, for a number of technologies, the positive impact on technolo-
gies we are looking for (in fact, it may even enhance this impact). As already
stated, this impact on technology decisions will reduce emissions in the do-
mestic country, so that the environmental benets of the emission trading
system are kept.
10Recall, however, that when q11 >  k221 =k211 the chances to have a positive impact are
higher than in the case where  = 0:
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5 Conclusion
We have shown that an emission trading system reduces the level of pro-
duction of the domestic rm, while the existence of a social constraint leads
to an increase in production. If the government is interested in keeping the
levels of production despite the emission trading system, an increase of the
social constraint may be an option. As stated, this is only possible as long
as the survival of the rms is not endangered.
However, this alternative reduces the impact of the emission trading sys-
tem on the environment via production reductions. Nevertheless, for a prob-
lem like climate change long term emissions may well be more relevant and
these are related to technology decisions. Our analysis has shown the condi-
tions under which the emission trading system will have a positive impact on
technology decisions in the domestic country. Furthermore, we have shown
the conditions under which this positive impact can be enhanced by the social
constraint.
Combining the results on production and on technology, we have shown
that a situation where production reductions are eliminated while technology
decisions are enhanced is possible, reducing thus emissions with no costs
associated with reduced production.
Di¢ culties associated with practical implementation of these results are
recognized. Nevertheless, our analysis highlights important interactions be-
tween emission trading, labor market rigidity and international competition,
which have to be taken into account while designing an emission trading sys-
tem, or while introducing measures to reduce market rigidity, two of the key
politics to be implemented in the European Union in the near future. That
is, increasing market rigidity may be an odd option to reduce international
competition distortions brought about by an emission trading system. How-
ever, the results of our simple model suggest the need to analyze carefully
the interrelations of these two policies in more complex models before setting
up, at the same time, an emission trading system and a more exible labor
market.
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